The Daily Dismantling of Dignity - Lives of Afghan Women & Girls Under Taliban Rule

30 Jun, 2025

“I am not free while any woman is unfree, even when her shackles are very different from my own. And I am not free as long as one person of colour remains chained. Nor is any one of you.”
~ Audre Lorde, “Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism”

An Apartheid Lived, But Unrecognised

In a nation where women’s rights are systematically stripped, voices still rise: soft but resolute. ‘Women are also human. We need to breathe too,’ said one Afghan woman, reacting to the Taliban’s hijab decree. This report captures those suffocated voices, their silenced dreams, and the structures that uphold their erasure.

Since August 2021, Afghanistan’s streets, schools, and courtrooms have been cleared of women by decree and by force. This isn’t merely a rollback of rights; it is a wholesale re-engineering of gender and power. Through over 70 directives targeting women’s participation in every aspect of society, from education to employment to leisure, the Taliban has built a legalized cage around half the population. These decrees are not just conservative policies. They are an institutionalized system of control, forcing women into erasure. And every element of a woman's existence: body, movement, voice, mind has become a site of state-sanctioned warfare.

Afghanistan is facing an unprecedented gender rights crisis under the Taliban regime. Since the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021, a “tightly interwoven patchwork of decrees, policies and practices” has been enforced to systematically exclude women and girls from all aspects of public life. At least 70 Taliban decrees and directives now target the lives, bodies, and choices of Afghan women and girls. These mutually reinforcing edicts, from banning education and employment to restricting movement and dress, are aimed at nothing less than the “structural denial of the personhood of women,” effectively erasing women’s presence from society. The Taliban’s vision for Afghanistan is predicated on the complete subordination of women and the “erasure of women and girls” as equal citizens.

This sharp reversal comes after a period (2001–2021) in which Afghan women had begun to reclaim rights in education, work, political participation, and freedom from violence. Those fragile gains have now been swiftly dismantled. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs has been abolished and replaced by a Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice; the 2009 Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) was repealed; shelters, legal aid centers, special courts and prosecution units for gender-based violence were shut down. Women’s affairs departments in provinces were closed, and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission was dissolved. In their place, the Taliban have created an apparatus focused on policing women’s conduct (for example, a “Grand Directorate” to monitor decree implementation). Afghan women, along with international experts, have begun to characterize these conditions as “gender apartheid”, reflecting the systematic, state-driven oppression akin to racial apartheid in its scope and cruelty.

Even before 2021, Afghanistan ranked among the worst places in the world for women by global indices. Now the situation is even more dire. According to the new Afghanistan Gender Index 2024, Afghan women on average can exercise only 17.3% of their full rights and freedoms, and women achieve only 23.7% of what men do across human development dimensions implying a staggering 76% gender gap. If compared globally, Afghanistan would rank second-to-last of 114 countries (ahead of only Yemen) in women’s empowerment and gender parity. In 2021 Afghanistan was already last (156 of 156) on the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index and last (170 of 170) on the Women, Peace and Security Index. These rankings have only plunged further as the Taliban’s actions “confine women and girls’ lives and prospects to the home.”

The short- and long-term costs of this gender apartheid are enormous. Taliban restrictions have instantly removed women from economic participation, with an estimated GDP loss of $1 billion (up to 5% of GDP) in just the first year. Nearly the entire population has been pushed into poverty, and women-headed households are suffering acutely (85% of women-headed households resorted to “negative coping mechanisms” by early 2022). Health experts warn maternal mortality will rise sharply due to pregnant women’s restricted mobility and loss of healthcare, and mental health indicators for women have plummeted (as discussed below). In sum, the Taliban’s gender discrimination is systematic and comprehensive, threatening not only women’s lives but Afghanistan’s broader development and stability. The following report details the severity and systemic nature of the crisis, with data and testimonies from Afghan women, organized by key domains: education, health, economic participation, political participation, freedom of movement, and freedom from violence. Policy implications and recommendations are presented to address this “most extensive attack on women’s and girls’ rights in the modern era.”

Education: Denial of Girls’ and Women’s Right to Learn

Education for females has been formally outlawed beyond primary school, destroying a generation’s prospects. On 23 March 2022, despite earlier promises, the Taliban abruptly suspended all secondary schooling for girls. As a result, over 1.1 million girls who had been enrolled in grades 7–12 were barred from attending class. In December 2022 this ban was escalated to universities: the Taliban banned women from tertiary education, forcing more than 100,000 young women to discontinue university studies overnight. In January 2023, women were further blocked from even sitting for university entrance exams. These edicts have effectively collapsed the female education system beyond elementary levels. By April 2023, 80% of all school-age Afghan girls and young women, roughly 2.5 million individuals, were out of school due to Taliban prohibitions. This includes almost every adolescent girl, as the vast majority of secondary-school girls (approximately 850,000 out of 1.1 million, or ~80%) are no longer attending classes.

Even at the primary level (which technically remains allowed), girls’ education is under pressure. Many families are “self-censoring” and keeping girls home as a protective measure in the face of Taliban statements and the climate of fear. In some rural areas, practical barriers such as lack of female teachers, long distances, and insecurity were always obstacles; now, with the regime’s sanctions, those gaps are worsening. Female teachers made up about 36% of all teachers in 2018 (mostly in cities), but many have since been pushed out. Where there are no women teachers available, a common situation now in conservative or remote districts, girls’ schooling often halts entirely. Taliban-imposed rules on gender segregation further constrain education: if a school or university cannot arrange separate classes or entrances for female students, the girls are the ones forced to drop out, not the boys. Many young women who are technically permitted to attend university (in select fields or locales) have stopped attending or declined to enroll, citing discomfort and lack of safety under the Taliban’s restrictive environment and pressure from families and community not to violate Taliban norms.

The consequences of denying education to women and girls are catastrophic and long-term. Literacy and educational attainment for Afghan females, which had slowly improved over two decades, will stagnate and reverse. The Afghanistan Gender Index projects that if the secondary education ban continues, the female secondary school completion rate will eventually drop to 0% for the relevant age cohort. Afghanistan already had one of the world’s lowest female literacy rates; now an entire generation of girls is being barred from developing skills, which will depress all development indicators. The gender gap in education and skills is “expected to widen as women are increasingly excluded from opportunities to build knowledge essential to participating in the economy and assuming leadership roles.” This loss of human capital also carries huge economic costs: one analysis estimated that banning women from secondary and higher education, thus shrinking the future female workforce, will reduce Afghanistan’s GDP by at least 2.5% (about $500 million) in the short term, with compounding losses over time as skills atrophy.

Moreover, social impacts are severe. With schools closed, child marriage rates are projected to rise, as families with limited options marry off teenage daughters often viewing marriage as a form of economic or physical security in an increasingly hostile environment for girls. Indeed, by late 2021 humanitarian agencies were warning of “girls increasingly at risk of child marriage” due to the convergence of poverty and the cessation of schooling. Disturbingly, reports have also emerged of Taliban officials themselves seeking to marry girls; some families have preemptively arranged marriages for daughters to protect them from being taken by Taliban members. The overall message sent by the Taliban’s education bans is the subordination of women to a life within the home.

*NEET = Not in Education, Employment, or Training.

Health and Sexual & Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR)

The health and well-being of Afghan women and girls have markedly deteriorated under Taliban rule. Even prior to 2021, Afghanistan had one of the highest maternal mortality rates and limited healthcare access for women, especially in rural areas. Those challenges have deepened into a crisis as the Taliban restrict women’s access to services and impose gender segregation in medical settings. Mobility restrictions (discussed further below) prevent many women from traveling to clinics or hospitals without a male chaperone, often resulting in dangerous delays or avoidance of care. In a 2022 survey, only 10% of women reported that they could even meet their basic health needs with available services (compared to 23% of men), a stark indicator of unmet needs. By 2023, humanitarian assessments estimated 11.6 million Afghan women and girls would require humanitarian health assistance, in part due to these man-made barriers to care.

Reproductive health and maternal care are under particular threat. The Taliban’s decrees effectively bar women from training as new doctors or nurses, for example, as of late 2024 women have been banned from enrolling in medical training institutes. This worsens an already critical shortage of female health professionals. Under Taliban dictates, male healthcare workers are forbidden from treating female patients, and female staff are often prohibited from working or even interacting with male colleagues. In some districts, 86% of health facilities have no female nurses and 71% have no female doctors available. Where a clinic or hospital has only male staff, women in need of prenatal care, childbirth assistance, or other treatment effectively have no access. Consequently, experts expect maternal mortality will rise sharply, reversing past progress. Pregnant women face the double burden of “restricted mobility for pregnant women as well as midwives”, meaning many cannot travel to give birth safely, nor can midwives reach them, alongside a surge in early pregnancies due to child marriage. All of these factors point to more women dying in childbirth and more infant deaths in the coming years.

Women’s sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR) are being eroded. Under the previous government, efforts were underway to improve family planning and maternal health, but Taliban conservatism has chilled those programs. Use of modern contraception in Afghanistan was already low; now it is further impeded by reduced outreach and women’s fear of seeking services. According to the UN, less than half (48.7%) of Afghan women with a demand for family planning have their need for modern contraceptives met. Taliban officials have not outright banned contraception but have reportedly discouraged it in some areas as against their interpretation of religious or cultural norms. The result is likely more unplanned pregnancies in a health system ill-prepared to handle them. The adolescent birth rate in Afghanistan remains extremely high at 62 births per 1,000 girls aged 15–19 (as estimated by UNFPA). This rate, driven by child marriage and lack of education, will likely climb higher as girls out of school get married earlier. Early childbearing poses serious health risks for teen mothers and limits their life opportunities, perpetuating a cycle of disempowerment.

Beyond physical health, Afghan women are grappling with a profound mental health crisis. The Taliban’s restrictions have triggered widespread feelings of anxiety, depression, and isolation among women who suddenly find their aspirations crushed and their daily freedoms curtailed. In April 2024, 68% of women rated their mental health status as “bad” or “very bad” (40% “very bad” plus 28% “bad”), compared to just 10% who said it was good: a drastic deterioration, and much worse than men’s self-reported mental health in the same survey. This corresponds with reports of increasing suicide and self-harm among women. A late 2022 study found that 48% of respondents knew at least one woman or girl who had developed anxiety or depression since the Taliban takeover, and 8% knew a woman or girl who had attempted suicide. Such despair is borne out of extreme hopelessness: women see no future as their rights to study, work, or even leave home are stripped away. The loss of autonomy and constant fear, of Taliban harassment, of being a burden to one’s family, of an empty future, have created a silent mental health emergency among Afghanistan’s women.

Employment and Economic Access

The Taliban’s policies have devastated women’s employment and economic security, driving countless families into poverty and removing women from public economic life. Immediately after the August 2021 takeover, most working women were told not to return to their jobs. By one month in, “100% of [surveyed] informants indicated they know women who lost their jobs” in that period. Over the past two years, the regime has issued targeted bans essentially excluding women from nearly all forms of paid work outside the home:

• In the public sector, female government employees were ordered to stay home (with a few exceptions in certain sectors) and encouraged to send male relatives to replace them. Today, the de facto administration employs virtually no women; an all-male cadre runs every ministry and local office.

• In December 2022, a decree banned Afghan women from working for any NGOs, domestic or international. This wiped out jobs for at least 15,000 women who had been employed by NGOs (as teachers, health workers, aid distributors, administrators, etc.). In April 2023, this ban was extended to the United Nations agencies as well, forcing even more educated women out of humanitarian and development work.

• In July 2023, the Taliban shut down all women’s beauty salons, one of the last female-driven small business sectors, citing vague “Islamic” moral reasons. This edict instantly put an estimated 60,000 women out of work across Afghanistan, and deprived many more of access to a women-only space that salons provided.

• Other economic activities have been squeezed: women journalists have been “barred from working” on media (fewer than 100 of Kabul’s 700 female journalists were still employed by late 2021). Women-owned businesses outside the home have largely closed due to either Taliban orders or lack of customers (since women cannot freely visit markets). Even home-based work, like tailoring or handicrafts, suffers from reduced market access.

The cumulative impact is starkly visible in labor force statistics. Women’s labor force participation plummeted after August 2021. In 2020, women made up about 18–23% of the labor force (different estimates give 18.8% or 23.3%): low, but rising slowly at the time. By the end of 2022, the female employment rate had dropped by ~25% compared to pre-Taliban levels, while male employment fell 7%. Young women have been especially hard-hit: youth employment for women fell 25% from Aug 2021 to Dec 2022. Overall unemployment more than doubled in a year, reaching up to an estimated 40% in 2022, with women disproportionately represented among the jobless. Tellingly, Afghanistan’s female labor force participation in 2024 is estimated at only 24%, compared to 89% of men: an immense gender gap in economic activity.

Paradoxically, surveys in late 2022 found a higher share of women reporting that they were in the labor force (seeking work), up to 45%, but this reflects desperation rather than empowerment. Women who have lost male breadwinners or face extreme poverty are trying to earn income however possible, often in informal or home-based roles traditionally seen as “acceptable” (sewing, baking, embroidery). These are typically low-paying and precarious. Critically, many women report they can only pursue livelihoods that the Taliban tacitly permit: “home-based work in feminized industries” that keeps women effectively hidden from public view. There is zero prospect of formal employment for most educated women now, teachers, lawyers, engineers, civil servants, business owners, all have been squeezed out unless they fit into Taliban-approved niches like female healthcare (and even there, hiring is limited and many qualified women have fled or been removed).

This economic exclusion of women has pushed families to the brink. With almost no women earning an income, millions of households have lost a vital source of support. Female-headed households (widows, wives of missing men, etc.) are in dire straits – 85% were resorting to extreme coping like skipping meals and taking on debt by early 2022. Overall, 97% of Afghanistan’s population is at risk of falling below the poverty line, a shocking figure to which the removal of women’s earnings has directly contributed. The Taliban’s December 2022 NGO worker ban exemplifies this: it “compounds the humanitarian and economic crises”, cutting off salaries for thousands of female aid workers and crippling aid delivery to women and children in need. In the immediate aftermath of that ban, 94% of Afghan NGOs surveyed had to fully or partially suspend operations, because without female staff they could not safely or effectively reach women beneficiaries. Sectors like education and protection services for women essentially halted. The long-term economic implications are grave: by removing women (who tend to invest earnings in children’s health and education), the Taliban are “removing the women of Afghanistan as a powerful economic, social and political force” undermining the country’s development for generations.

Another facet of economic access is financial inclusion, where Afghan women have historically been marginalized and the gap is now widening. In 2020, under 7% of Afghan women had a bank account. In 2024, survey data found only 6.8% of women have a personal or joint account or use mobile money, compared to 20% of men. This low financial access means women cannot easily save money, borrow capital, or receive funds directly. The closure of women-run businesses and NGOs also curtailed women’s access to microfinance programs that once existed. Additionally, women face barriers in accessing humanitarian cash aid without a male relative present, due to Taliban rules. All these factors reinforce female economic dependency on men. Many Afghan women now describe themselves as feeling like a “burden” on their families because they are forbidden from earning a living: a dramatic loss of dignity and autonomy for those who once proudly worked as teachers, doctors, or entrepreneurs.

In macroeconomic terms, excluding women comes at a steep price. A UNDP analysis right after the takeover warned that keeping women out of the workforce could result in an “immediate economic loss of up to $1 billion or 5% of GDP.” This estimate proved prescient. Another study projected that the shrinking of jobs and education for women would cut GDP by 2.5% in the first year alone. These losses will compound as human capital erodes; Afghanistan is essentially foregoing the contributions of half its population. No economy can thrive under such conditions. The World Bank noted the economy already contracted by 30–35% in 2021–2022, and continued gender-based restrictions ensure growth prospects remain bleak. In short, Taliban policies have pushed Afghan women “out of jobs and into poverty,” forcing a reversal of women’s economic empowerment that took two decades to build.

Political Participation and Public Life

Under the Taliban’s regime, women have been completely erased from formal political participation and leadership. The previous Afghan constitution (2004) had guaranteed women the right to vote, run for office, and serve in government including a quota of women in parliament (which resulted in 27% of seats held by women by 2021). All of that was swept away when the Taliban seized power. The de facto authorities formed in September 2021 consist entirely of male Taliban members; not a single woman was included in the cabinet or appointed as a provincial governor, district official, or judge. Afghanistan went from having 68 women members in its lower house of parliament (before it was dissolved) to zero women in any legislative or governing body. In the Afghanistan Gender Index 2024, the indicators for women’s political representation scored a “perfect” zero: women hold 0% of seats in the national cabinet and 0% in local governance structures. This is a total reversal of two decades of efforts to include women in governance and decision-making.

The Taliban’s stance is that governance is “not a place for women.” Early on, they shuttered the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, an institution that had supported women’s advancement, and reportedly converted its building into offices for the religious morality police. They also abolished the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which had highlighted women’s rights issues. With these bodies gone, there is no institutional advocate for women inside the regime. Taliban leaders even avoided token gestures: for example, a grand assembly (jirga) of clerics and elders held in June 2022 (with around 4,500 participants) pointedly excluded women entirely, not even allowing women to sit behind a curtain as observers. When asked about women’s absence from governance, Taliban officials have said that “women should remain at home” and that male relatives can represent them if needed. This reflects an extreme interpretation that a woman’s role is only within the family, not the state.

Women who formerly held public office, parliamentarians, mayors, judges, civil servants, have largely fled the country or gone into hiding. Many received threats; some women judges, for example, feared retribution from the very convicts (often violent offenders) they had once sentenced, whom the Taliban freed from prison. The Taliban have not allowed women to return to judicial roles; instead, they have imposed their all-male interpretation of Sharia courts. The entire justice system is now male-dominated, and often hostile to women’s interests. One immediate consequence was the disbandment of special EVAW courts and prosecution units that had handled domestic abuse and gender violence cases. Women experiencing violence or seeking divorce have no female officers or judges to turn to (this is further explored in the GBV section). In local communities, structures like district women’s shuras (councils) or women on community development committees were either dissolved or sidelined. Where women once had a voice in local decisions, they are now silent or silenced.

Beyond formal politics, women’s participation in civic life and civil society has been crushed. The vibrant women’s rights NGOs and associations that existed are mostly shut. Approximately 77% of Afghan women’s civil society organizations had no funding and ceased activities by mid-2022, as donors pulled out and the Taliban imposed licensing barriers and intimidation. Women-led NGOs have been specifically targeted: the Taliban’s NGO worker ban in Dec 2022 was partly aimed at women’s rights organizations, many of which have not been able to continue any work. Women activists who organized protests for their rights in Kabul and other cities in late 2021 and 2022 faced violent crackdowns: protesters were beaten, “attacked, detained and threatened” by Taliban security forces. Several outspoken women’s advocates were arrested or disappeared for days or weeks at a time. The Taliban have effectively criminalized peaceful assembly for women; even small gatherings have to be done quietly and at great risk. Consequently, Afghanistan’s public sphere has lost the voices of women whether in media, civil society, or political debate.

The media and cultural representation of women has likewise been severely curtailed, contributing to their erasure. In November 2021, the Taliban issued directives that “women actors are prohibited from appearing in television dramas,” among other media restrictions. Most female TV anchors were forced off air (those who remained had to cover their faces on camera by mid-2022). Popular programs featuring women were canceled. Women have been warned not to partake in music or art publicly; for instance, by 2024 some provinces even banned women’s voices at weddings (no singing, and even clapping was forbidden in certain cases). This cultural clampdown reinforces the message that women should be invisible. The reports note that the absence of women in media “has a chilling effect: erasing women from the public eye and normalizing male dominance” in all professions.

In summary, Afghan women have been denied any role in shaping their country’s future under the Taliban. They cannot vote (the Taliban have abolished elections altogether). They cannot hold office. They cannot even voice opinions through civil society or media without fear. The silencing of half the population undermines governance and peace. As Afghan women activists have pointed out, any decisions about Afghanistan made without women’s inclusion, whether inside the country or in international discussions, “normalize the absence” of women and risk cementing their inferior status. Women leaders insist that “Afghan women can and should be able to represent themselves in their diversity” at any forum about the country’s future. The current regime, however, offers them no such opportunity. The implications are grim: laws and policies are made with zero female perspective, likely entrenching discrimination further. And a generation of girls sees no women in power, depriving them of role models and signaling that their voices do not matter. This systematic exclusion of women from public decision-making is a core pillar of what many now deem gender apartheid in Afghanistan.

Freedom of Movement and Bodily Autonomy

The Taliban have systematically restricted the freedom of movement of women and girls, effectively segregating them in private spaces. Almost immediately after taking power, local Taliban authorities began imposing rules that women should not travel without a male guardian (mahram). By December 2021, a formal directive from Kabul ordered that any woman traveling more than about 72 km (45 miles) must be accompanied by a male family member. This male chaperone requirement now applies to most forms of travel, intercity transport often won’t sell a ticket to a woman lacking a mahram, and even within cities many taxi drivers refuse women unaccompanied. By mid-2022, enforcement tightened further: the Ministry for Promotion of Virtue issued guidance that women should generally not leave home at all unless necessary, and should cover fully (including faces) if they do. In an October 2021 rapid survey, 72% of local respondents reported new rules restricting women’s movement in their area: a figure that likely reached near 100% of communities by 2022 as Taliban edicts spread. Many families, as noted, have internalized these norms and self-enforce: fathers and husbands keep women at home to avoid potential punishment or harassment by Taliban morality patrols. This has led to what Afghan women describe as a “climate of fear and uncertainty” that keeps them in domestic confinement.

In addition to travel barriers, the Taliban have banned women from public spaces of recreation and leisure, further isolating them. In Fall 2022, national authorities announced that women are no longer allowed to visit public parks, gardens, gyms, or bath houses (hammams), even on segregated days. Parks and city recreational areas that used to have “women-only” days shut their gates to women entirely. This was devastating for many urban women who relied on these spaces for rare outings and exercise. Women’s public baths, an important facility in Afghan culture (especially in winter and for those without indoor plumbing), were likewise closed to women, cutting off another female-only social space. Together, these rules send a clear signal that *women should not be seen in public. One Kabul woman reacted: “It’s like we’re prisoners now in our own city.” The removal of such basic freedoms, to take a walk in a park, to travel to see relatives, to bathe outside the home, has a profound impact on mental health and autonomy (as reflected in the mental health data above).

The Taliban have also enforced strict dress codes and gender segregation that constrain movement. In May 2022, the Supreme Leader in Kandahar decreed that women in public must wear a full-body covering that only leaves the eyes visible (interpreted as either the blue burqa or a head-to-toe black hijab with face veil). Families were instructed to keep women home entirely if they could not comply. The decree threatened male guardians with punishment if their female relatives were “improperly” dressed outside. This has effectively made many women too fearful to go out: a key informant explained that even with a burqa, the sight of armed Taliban enforcing dress and behavior causes immense stress. By mid-2022, 86% of communities reported new rules on women’s clothing in public. The Taliban’s morality police routinely stop women to check attire, and there have been cases of women being whipped or detained for alleged dress code breaches. Gender segregation rules mean many public offices, banks, or aid distribution sites either cannot serve women (if no female staff or separate area) or impose cumbersome “women-only days” which are limited. When such accommodations are not made, women are simply told to send a male relative to do their errands further reinforcing their invisibility.

All these restrictions on movement and public presence have one overarching goal: to confine women to the home. Taliban spokesmen often invoke a reactionary interpretation of “protecting women’s honor” to justify these measures, claiming women are safer at home. In reality, these policies strip women of independence and make daily life extraordinarily difficult. Women cannot go to markets freely to buy food or supplies; they cannot visit health clinics far away; they cannot attend social gatherings or even funerals if travel is required. The need for a male escort poses a particular hardship on widows or women without immediate male family, some have virtually no way to leave their village or neighborhood. The loss of free movement also means women are cut off from information and networks, exacerbating isolation. One direct result noted by observers is a worsening of domestic violence and family stress: men under economic strain and women trapped at home has increased tensions (with women having literally nowhere to escape).

The Taliban’s restrictions even extend to cultural life and personal expression, underscoring the intent to eliminate women’s visibility. Music and dance, once common at women’s gatherings like weddings, have been curtailed. In some areas (e.g., Nangarhar in early 2024), Taliban officials banned women from even participating in singing or clapping at weddings alongside men. Female singers and artists had already mostly fled the country or gone silent. The few women who still worked as journalists or YouTubers have been told to stop; in February 2024, there were reports of increased Taliban pressure on women to stop using social media or watching TV. Effectively, any arena in which women might be seen or heard by the public, whether physical spaces like parks or virtual spaces like media, is being closed to them. This comprehensive segregation has led many analysts and Afghan women to conclude that the Taliban are imposing a de facto gender segregation apartheid, aiming to eliminate the “female” presence from society outside the home.

Gender-Based Violence and Protection

Afghan women and girls have long faced extremely high rates of gender-based violence (GBV), and under the Taliban this epidemic of violence is exacerbated by the loss of legal protections and support services. Even before 2021, studies suggested that almost 9 in 10 Afghan women (87%) experience at least one form of intimate partner violence in their lifetime: one of the highest prevalence rates in the world. Such violence includes physical abuse, sexual violence, psychological abuse, and economic deprivation by spouses or family members. Under the previous government, modest progress was made: the EVAW law criminalized many forms of domestic violence and harmful practices; dozens of women’s shelters were operating; family response units in police stations were staffed by policewomen; and special prosecution units and courts handled GBV cases. All of that infrastructure no longer exists. The Taliban repealed the EVAW law, dismantled shelters, ended legal aid for women, and disbanded the special courts and units that prosecuted abusers. In effect, women and girls now have virtually no recourse to justice or support if they are subjected to violence at home or in the community.

The Taliban’s ultraconservative ideology and practices have also likely led to an increase in certain forms of GBV. For example, reports indicate a rise in “honor”-motivated violence and forced marriages. The Taliban have not banned child marriage, on the contrary, as noted, child and forced marriages of girls have been rising due to economic desperation and a lack of alternatives (like education). Some Taliban officials themselves have been implicated in taking child brides or forcing widows of fallen fighters to marry them, as was feared widely when they took power. There are also credible reports of Taliban members engaging in baad, the giving of women or girls to settle disputes, and other coercive practices with impunity. Women have essentially lost any avenue to complain or seek help: the Ministry of Women’s Affairs that once received GBV complaints is gone, and approaching Taliban police or courts often results in the woman herself being blamed or even punished (for “running away from home” or “moral crimes”). This creates a huge climate of fear and silence around domestic violence; many women feel they must endure abuse with no escape.

Statistical indicators on violence reflect a dire situation. A World Health Organization analysis found that Afghan women’s reported rate of physical or sexual intimate-partner violence in the past 12 months is 34.7%, nearly three times the global average of 13%. In other words, over one-third of Afghan women have suffered recent abuse by a partner, an astounding figure for a one-year period. This high incidence is likely underreported, given stigma and lack of reporting mechanisms; the true figure could be higher. Additionally, practices like “honor” killings (male relatives killing women/girls for perceived moral infractions) still occur and are rarely if ever prosecuted now. Under the Taliban’s de facto rule, there is little deterrence for a man who kills or brutalizes a female family member; the formal justice system often doesn’t prioritize such cases, and there is no independent human rights commission to track them as before. The Taliban have even freed many perpetrators of gender-based crimes. For instance, women activists noted that known wife-beaters or even murderers who had been jailed under the previous government were released as part of general prison releases, and are now back in communities without oversight.

The removal of protections has been devastating for survivors of violence. Under the Taliban, women’s shelters had to shut down: the Taliban do not officially allow the concept of shelters, often viewing them with suspicion (previously they alleged shelters “promoted immorality” by letting women escape families). In late 2021, Taliban fighters even took over some shelter premises and forced women living there to return to their abusers or families. With shelters closed, women fleeing severe abuse or threats of “honor” killing have nowhere to go. Some have tried to reach the border to escape, but that’s not feasible for most. Others have simply been forced to endure violence in silence. Legal accountability for GBV is effectively null: the specialized EVAW prosecutors were removed, and Taliban law (to the extent they apply Sharia) often prioritizes family reconciliation or punishment of adultery rather than protecting women. In Taliban courts, a woman alleging rape, for example, might herself be accused of fornication if she can’t meet the burden of proof (four male witnesses, etc.). This means rape survivors are extremely unlikely to come forward.

Another dimension is state violence against women. While not typically framed as GBV, the Taliban’s crackdowns on women protesters, as well as the arbitrary detention of female activists, can involve physical and psychological violence targeted at women because of their gender (and dissent). Women protesters in 2021–2022 recounted being beaten with rifle butts, whipped, and in some cases tortured in custody for demanding their rights. In one notorious case in 2022, a group of women protesting for education were followed home, and Taliban agents conducted night raids detaining them; some were held for weeks incommunicado. Such incidents instill terror and are clearly gender-targeted repression.

The combined effect of pervasive private-sphere violence and draconian public-sphere repression is that Afghan women and girls face violence without protection. Many live in constant threat inside the home from abusive husbands or forced marriages, and outside from the Taliban’s enforcement or militant extremists. And unlike in the past, there is no public outlet to seek help: “the system that aimed to provide support and justice to survivors of GBV… had previously served thousands of women” has been entirely dismantled. Women’s rights defenders emphasize that impunity for gender-based violence is now total, and that Afghanistan has become a place where violence against women is effectively state-sanctioned by virtue of state inaction or complicity. This dire reality is a cornerstone of calls to label the Taliban’s treatment of women as “gender persecution” or “gender apartheid”, which could carry international legal ramifications. As Afghan women have pleaded, the world must recognize that the Taliban are engaging in “mass violations of women’s rights” and that without accountability, those violations, including extreme violence, will continue unabated.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

Taliban security personnel confront women protesting for their rights in Kabul (August 2022). Such scenes exemplify the regime’s systematic gender-based oppression, which international bodies are increasingly recognizing as potential crimes against humanity.

The findings above illustrate that Afghanistan under the Taliban has become the most repressive country in the world for women’s rights, a reality that demands urgent and principled action from the international community. The severity and systemic nature of this state-sponsored gender discrimination, aptly described by many as “gender apartheid”, means that traditional engagement and humanitarian approaches must be rethought. Afghan women are calling on global actors to recognize their plight as a unique emergency and to respond with the same resolve that other gross violations (like racial apartheid) historically prompted. Below are key policy implications and recommendations:

• Recognize, Codify, and Condemn “Gender Apartheid”: The Taliban’s treatment of women and girls has been described by UN experts and activists as “gender apartheid”: an institutionalized regime of systematic domination and oppression on the basis of gender. The international community should formally acknowledge that the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls constitutes gender persecution at an institutional scale. Using the term “gender apartheid” can help galvanize action, much as the world united against racial apartheid in the 20th century. This recognition could lay the groundwork for legal accountability. For instance, states and the UN should explore avenues to declare gender apartheid a crime under international law, as urged by Afghan women advocates. A global coalition against gender apartheid in Afghanistan, involving governments, UN entities, Islamic scholars, and civil society, could increase pressure on the Taliban regime by making it a pariah on this issue. Currently, the Rome Statute explicitly criminalizes persecution on gender grounds as a crime against humanity, but it does not explicitly name gender-based apartheid (the Statute’s apartheid provision is defined in terms of racial discrimination). While the ICC Prosecutor’s gender persecution charges cover much of this conduct, leading human rights voices argue that the concept of gender apartheid captures the full systematic and institutionalized nature of the Taliban’s campaign against women. Amnesty International and others therefore urge that “gender apartheid” be formally recognized as a crime under international law. As a policy recommendation, States should work to incorporate gender apartheid into emerging international legal instruments. One immediate opportunity is the proposed UN treaty on Crimes Against Humanity currently under discussion – states could advocate adding gender apartheid as a distinct offense in the treaty’s text. Alternatively, States Parties to the ICC could consider an amendment to the Rome Statute to include gender apartheid, or issue interpretative resolutions affirming that systematic gender oppression is encompassed by existing crimes (“other inhumane acts” or persecution). Recognizing gender apartheid in international law would fill a gap by naming and shaming what is happening in Afghanistan (and elsewhere) as the atrocity that it is, and would empower future prosecutions. This move has been championed by Afghan women’s rights defenders since the 1990s and now carries the support of numerous feminist activists and even Nobel laureates worldwide. By codifying gender apartheid, the international community would strengthen the legal basis to investigate and punish those who impose regimes of gender segregation, leaving no doubt that such policies amount to crimes against humanity.

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• Ensure Women’s Inclusion in All Diplomacy and Decision-Making: Any negotiations or international discussions regarding Afghanistan’s future must include Afghan women at the table. It is unacceptable that forums like the Doha talks or UN meetings about Afghanistan have had few or no women. Afghan women leaders (from diverse backgrounds) should be formally integrated into peace talks, donor conferences, and humanitarian coordination bodies. As one women’s group put it, “the international community should establish formal mechanisms to guarantee women’s inclusion” in all forums on Afghanistan, to avoid normalizing their exclusion. Moreover, when engaging the Taliban, international envoys should themselves model inclusion, for example, by having senior women diplomats lead negotiations. When we say include women, we mean senior women in your teams should be leading your interactions with the Taliban… Afghan women should be consulted every step, don’t exclude women. This not only brings crucial perspectives, but also signals to the Taliban that women’s rights are non-negotiable and visible.

• Do Not Trade Off Women’s Rights for Short-Term Gains: Humanitarian agencies and donors face a dilemma in Afghanistan: how to deliver aid under Taliban restrictions. While life-saving assistance is critical, the principle of gender equality cannot be sidelined. The Taliban have tried to use aid as leverage, insisting on their terms (like the ban on women NGO workers). The UN and NGOs should continue to refuse any conditions that violate fundamental rights, aligning with the stance that “humanitarian aid should be provided based on need, without discrimination”. Programmes that exclude or marginalize women (so-called “gender-blind” aid) should be avoided. Donors must prioritize funding initiatives that directly benefit and involve women, for example, supporting health services “by women, for women” through creative means (such as remote telemedicine by female doctors, or safely negotiated local exemptions for female staff). Any engagement with the Taliban on humanitarian issues should consistently advocate for the removal of bans impeding women’s participation; it should be made clear that these edicts are stark violations of humanitarian principles and harm the entire population. In short, the world must resist the temptation to accept Taliban restrictions as “cultural”; they are deliberate rights violations that will have long-term consequences if appeased.

• Support Afghan Women’s Resistance and Resilience: Despite the oppression, Afghan women continue to show remarkable resolve, from secretly running community schools for girls, to small acts of defiance like protest graffiti, to continuing businesses from their homes and forming underground networks. The international community should find ways to bolster this women-led civil society, even if it has to operate semi-clandestinely. Flexible, long-term funding should be directed to women’s organizations (including those in exile or cross-border) that provide services or advocacy for Afghan women. This can include psychosocial support, underground education, documentation of abuses (for future accountability), and livelihood projects that women can do from home. Creative channels, perhaps via UN agencies or trusted NGOs, are needed since the Taliban obstruct official women’s groups. Moreover, diplomatic missions still in Kabul (from neighboring countries, etc.) should quietly maintain contacts with women activists and entrepreneurs to provide moral support and a lifeline to the outside world. “Hold space open for women, rethink risk and fund creatively,” as UN Women’s recent policy guidance urges.

• Leverage International Instruments and Pressure: Thus far, condemnations have not moved the Taliban, but more tangible pressure could be considered. The UN Security Council has condemned the bans and even imposed some travel restrictions on Taliban leaders, yet no targeted sanctions for women’s rights violations have been applied in a unified way. Countries could expand sanctions (like asset freezes or travel bans) on key Taliban figures specifically citing GBV and gender oppression under the Global Magnitsky or other human rights accountability laws. The recently established UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan and the UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls should continue to investigate and document Taliban abuses; there is a need for a more robust international fact-finding mission or commission of inquiry focused on women’s rights. If gender persecution can be legally documented, cases could even be referred to the International Criminal Court (which has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, potentially including gender-based persecution). Islamic nations and scholars also have a crucial role: they should unequivocally clarify that the Taliban’s actions have no basis in Islam’s core teachings, undermining the Taliban’s justification. Regional powers engaging the Taliban (like Qatar, Pakistan, etc.) must press them to reverse the most egregious policies; continued engagement should not come at the expense of silent acquiescence to gender apartheid.

• Leverage International Instruments and Pressure (UN Security Council and Multilateral Actions): In parallel to court-based strategies, diplomatic and multilateral pressure should be intensified to isolate and penalize the Taliban’s leadership for their gender crimes. Thus far, condemnations have not moved the Taliban, but more tangible pressure could be considered. The UN Security Council has condemned the bans and even imposed some travel restrictions on Taliban leaders, yet no targeted sanctions for women’s rights violations have been applied in a unified way. Countries could expand sanctions (like asset freezes or travel bans) on key Taliban figures specifically citing GBV and gender oppression under the Global Magnitsky or other human rights accountability laws. The recently established UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan and the UN Working Group on discrimination against women and girls should continue to investigate and document Taliban abuses; there is a need for a more robust international fact-finding mission or commission of inquiry focused on women’s rights. If gender persecution can be legally documented, cases could even be referred to the International Criminal Court (which has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, potentially including gender-based persecution). Islamic nations and scholars also have a crucial role: they should unequivocally clarify that the Taliban’s actions have no basis in Islam’s core teachings, undermining the Taliban’s justification. Regional powers engaging the Taliban (like Qatar, Pakistan, etc.) must press them to reverse the most egregious policies; continued engagement should not come at the expense of silent acquiescence to gender apartheid. The UN Security Council (UNSC) could play a pivotal role. First, the Council should adopt strong resolutions condemning the Taliban’s systemic discrimination against women as a threat to international peace and security. Explicitly labeling the abuses as crimes against humanity or gender-based persecution in a UNSC resolution would underscore the global consensus that the Taliban’s conduct is illegitimate. While Afghanistan is already an ICC member (giving the Court jurisdiction without a UNSC referral), a Security Council referral or endorsement of the ICC’s investigation could bolster its legitimacy and put additional political weight behind efforts to arrest suspects. For example, the UNSC could call on all states to cooperate with the ICC in this situation, similar to past referrals for Darfur and Libya, and thus make non-cooperation itself a breach of international peace mandates. Additionally, the Council should use its Chapter VII powers to impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for the repression of women. Many Taliban officials (including Akhundzada and his inner circle) are already under travel bans or asset freezes from earlier sanctions regimes; these should be updated and expanded with specific justification tied to gender persecution and apartheid. A UNSC resolution could demand the lifting of bans on women’s education and work, with clear benchmarks, and threaten further measures if unmet. Although consensus in the Council is not guaranteed (and veto-wielding members may be hesitant), sustained advocacy by member states can keep the spotlight on gender atrocities. Meanwhile, other multilateral forums are also being activated: a coalition of states has initiated a case against Afghanistan at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) for failure to uphold women’s rights. This ICJ process, essentially suing the Afghan state for breaching women’s rights, should be supported and accelerated, as it complements criminal accountability by affirming state responsibility for the Taliban’s actions. The UN Human Rights Council should likewise continue its scrutiny, renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan and the UN expert panel on Taliban abuses, and consider establishing an independent investigative mechanism if needed. All these measures work in concert: international justice efforts, backed by diplomatic isolation and legal condemnation, increase pressure on the Taliban’s top figures. The message must be clear that the global community will not tolerate gender-based persecution. Whether through the ICC’s arrest warrants, universal jurisdiction trials, Security Council sanctions, or world court judgments, the de facto Afghan authorities should face unified international resolve. This would not only seek justice for Afghan women and girls, but also serve notice to any regime contemplating similar gender apartheid policies in the future.

• Prepare for the Future Now: The current crisis will eventually evolve and when it does, Afghanistan will desperately need the talents and leadership of its women. The international community should lay groundwork for a post-Taliban or reformed scenario by investing in Afghan women’s education and leadership in exile. Scholarships for Afghan women and girls to study abroad are vital so that an educated cohort is not entirely lost; regional countries could be supported to host Afghan women students. Likewise, training and mentorship programs for Afghan women in the diaspora can help preserve their skills (in journalism, law, public administration) for the time when they can return. Documentation of the violations occurring now is important for future transitional justice: Afghan women’s testimonies should be collected safely now to inform accountability processes later. In essence, the world must make it clear that the erasure of women will not be tolerated long-term, and when political conditions change, women’s full participation in rebuilding Afghanistan will be non-negotiable.

• Continue and Support ICC Prosecution for Gender Persecution: The ICC Office of the Prosecutor, led by Karim A. A. Khan KC with Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan, has already filed applications for arrest warrants against Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani on charges of crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds. This marks the first time the ICC has pursued a case of gender-based persecution at this level. The Pre-Trial Chamber should swiftly authorize these arrest warrants, given the evidence of “numerous severe deprivations of fundamental rights” imposed on Afghan women and girls since August 2021. ICC States Parties and supporting countries must publicly back the ICC’s efforts and provide resources and cooperation to the investigation. Notably, six States Parties (France, Spain, Chile, Costa Rica, Luxembourg, and Mexico) have already formally referred the situation in Afghanistan to the ICC, urging the court to focus on crimes against women and girls under Taliban rule. All ICC member states should follow suit by voicing support and pledging cooperation. This includes sharing evidence of Taliban abuses, seconding experts (such as gender-crimes specialists) to assist the ICC, and resisting political pressure aimed at undermining the court’s work. As Human Rights Watch emphasizes, member countries should ensure the ICC “has the backing and practical assistance it needs” to carry forward and expand its Afghanistan investigation. Robust support for the ICC’s case will reinforce that the oppression of women and girls is not an internal affair, but a serious international crime warranting accountability.

• Enforce Accountability through State Cooperation and Universal Jurisdiction: Achieving justice will ultimately require arrest and prosecution of responsible individuals, but Taliban leaders are unlikely to surrender themselves. Therefore, State cooperation is crucial. All countries – especially Afghanistan’s neighbors and those where Taliban officials may travel – should be prepared to execute ICC arrest warrants if these suspects set foot on their territory. In practice, this means denying safe haven to perpetrators of gender persecution. Governments can proactively announce that Taliban officials named in international arrest warrants will be detained and surrendered to The Hague if possible. In addition, states with universal jurisdiction laws should explore domestic prosecutions of Taliban authorities for crimes against humanity. Universal jurisdiction (already used by some states to prosecute Syrian war crimes, for example) allows national courts to try serious international crimes regardless of where they occurred. Given the abundant evidence of the Taliban’s abuses, from official decrees and edicts to victim testimony and UN reports, prosecutors in countries like Germany, France, or others could open investigations into Taliban officials for torture, persecution, or other inhumane acts against women. Such cases can complement the ICC process and put additional pressure on the de facto regime. At a minimum, even the prospect of foreign prosecution further isolates Taliban leaders, reinforcing that they have no escape from justice. To facilitate this, civil society and Afghan diaspora groups should continue to document abuses and build case files that could be used in any jurisdiction. An International Support or Investigative Mechanism (akin to those for Syria and Myanmar) could be established to collect and preserve evidence of gender-based crimes by the Taliban, ensuring that prosecutors, whether at the ICC or in national courts, have the needed proof to bring charges when opportunities arise.

In conclusion, the situation of Afghan women under Taliban rule demands an unprecedented legal and policy response. The Rome Statute’s framework does allow prosecution of gender-based crimes, as evidenced by the ICC Prosecutor’s bold initiative to charge the Taliban leadership. Going forward, the international community should capitalize on this momentum. By empowering the ICC process, expanding legal definitions to encompass “gender apartheid,” ensuring no safe haven for perpetrators, and mobilizing collective action through the UN, we can forge a multi-faceted accountability strategy. These policy steps, taken together, would not only bring hope of justice to Afghan women and girls, but also reinforce the principle that gross violations of women’s rights anywhere are truly crimes against humanity that will be prosecuted and punished. Such an approach underlines a critical implication for global policy: protecting women’s rights is inseparable from maintaining international peace, justice, and human dignity.

Wrapping Up? NO…

The Taliban’s systematic subjugation of women and girls is not only a human rights catastrophe for Afghanistan but a profound threat to the country’s future stability, prosperity, and peace. No society can thrive while half its population is shut out of education, work, and public life. The patterns documented, from the ban on schooling, to the economic pauperization of women, to the silencing of their voices and the violence against their bodies, all point to an attempt to erase women from the public identity of a nation. This attempt will fail in the long run, as Afghan women’s resilience persists in the face of oppression. However, the damage being done each day is deep and intensifying. It is incumbent on policymakers, human rights bodies, and international leaders to treat this as a gender rights emergency and respond with the urgency and resolve that it demands. The window for action is narrowing: as months pass, more girls lose their future, more women sink into despair or destitution, and the fabric of Afghan society is torn by the removal of women’s contributions. The policy message is clear: the rights of Afghan women and girls are the red line for any normalization of the Taliban regime. Sustained international pressure, creative strategies to empower women under repression, and unwavering solidarity with Afghan women can together help reverse the current trends. The women and girls of Afghanistan are not giving up on their rights and neither should the world. Each lost year for them is a loss for all humanity’s commitment to equality and justice. The plight of Afghan women thus stands as a defining test of the international community’s willingness to uphold universal human rights in the face of oppression. The world’s response, or silence, will echo for years to come. This report is a testament to resistance in the face of erasure. So, I will reiterate the words of one Afghan woman who put it simply yet powerfully, ‘Women are also human. We need to breathe too.’ Advocacy must begin by honoring that breath and ensuring it is not the last.

Sources

1. Gender Index 2024: Afghanistan. June 17, 2025. UN Women.
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8. Gender alert I: Women’s rights in Afghanistan: Where are we now? December 7, 2021. UN Women.
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10. Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in Afghanistan. Office of the Prosecutor. International Criminal Court.
11. Afghanistan: ICC Prosecutor Seeks Gender Persecution Charges. Human Rights Watch.
12. Global: Gender apartheid must be recognized as a crime under international law. Amnesty International.
13. What an ICC Case on Mali Means for Taliban Crimes Against Women. Belquis Ahmadi; Lauren Baillie; Grace Luloff. United States Institute of Peace.
14. How the Taliban is using law for gender apartheid, and how to push back. Wesna Saidy and Iavor Rangelov. Atlantic Council.

#gender apartheid